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Note 
ANALOG SOLUTIONS: E-DISCOVERY 
SPOLIATION SANCTIONS AND THE 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FRCP 37(E) 
SCOTT M. O’BRIEN† 
ABSTRACT 
  The ever-increasing importance of digital technology in today’s 
commercial environment has created several serious problems for 
courts operating under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
(FRCP) discovery regime. As the volume of discoverable information 
has grown exponentially, so too have the opportunities for abuse and 
misinterpretation of the FRCP’s outdated e-discovery rules. Federal 
courts are divided over the criteria for imposing the most severe 
discovery sanctions as well as the practical ramifications of the 
preservation duty as applied to electronically stored information. As a 
result, litigants routinely feel pressured to overpreserve potentially 
discoverable data, often at great expense. 
  At a conference at the Duke University School of Law in 2010, 
experts from all sides of the civil-litigation system concluded that the 
e-discovery rules were in desperate need of updating. The subsequent 
four years saw a flurry of rulemaking efforts. In 2014, a package of 
proposed FRCP amendments included a complete overhaul of Rule 
37(e), the provision governing spoliation sanctions for electronically 
stored information. This Note analyzes the proposed Rule and argues 
that the amendment will fail to accomplish the Advisory Committee’s 
goals because it focuses too heavily on preserving the trial court’s 
discretion in imposing sanctions and focuses too little on incentivizing 
efficient and cooperative pretrial discovery. The Note concludes by 
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offering revisions and enforcement mechanisms that would allow the 
new Rule 37(e) to better address the e-discovery issues identified at the 
Duke Conference. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO) opened an investigation into the accounting and financial 
practices of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae).1 The preliminary investigation report, which found that Fannie 
Mae “had departed from generally accepted accounting principles in 
order to manipulate its reported earnings and inflate executive 
compensation,” prompted several private civil suits that became a 
single multidistrict litigation in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia.2 Parties to the civil suit served the OFHEO 
with a third-party subpoena to produce more than thirty categories of 
documents related to the investigation and the OFHEO agreed to 
provide the electronically stored information (ESI) voluntarily, 
apparently not comprehending the true volume of data requested.3 
The OFHEO missed multiple production deadlines and the district 
court ultimately held the agency in contempt, despite the fact that the 
OFHEO had spent approximately $6 million—more than 9 percent of 
the agency’s annual budget—responding to the request.4 The D.C. 
Circuit affirmed, holding that “[t]he sanction was a proper exercise of 
the district court’s contempt power because it coerced compliance 
with the stipulated order and compensated the individual defendants 
for the delay they suffered.”5 After dedicating nearly a tenth of its 
total budget to a single production request, the court forced the 
OFHEO to produce all responsive documents—including those 
withheld for privilege—at its own cost.6 
In modern civil litigation, the OFHEO’s experience is hardly an 
outlier.7 The central role of computers and electronic storage systems 
in today’s business environment (and society at large) has driven 
 
 1. In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 817. 
 4. Id. at 817–18. 
 5. Id. at 823. 
 6. Id. at 818. 
 7. See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
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exponential growth in the volume of ESI,8 which in turn has increased 
costs and delays in the pretrial discovery process.9 One major 
company estimated that costs related to ESI production in a 
“midsize” case can range from $2.5 million to $3.5 million.10 The 
costly nature of production, sometimes a result of abuse of the 
procedural rules for discovery, has often spurred amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.11 These issues came to the forefront 
once again in May 2010 when the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 
(the Advisory Committee or Committee) held a conference at the 
Duke University School of Law (the Duke Conference or 
Conference) to address “the issues of cost and delay in the federal 
civil-litigation system.”12 Participants voiced concerns that “the system 
can be abused so that the goals of Rule 1 are not achieved . . . [and] 
discovery can be used for impermissible purposes such as increasing 
the burdens of litigation to gain an unjustified advantage . . . .”13 
Pursuant to the Duke Conference’s recommendations, the Advisory 
Committee proposed a package of amendments that included a 
wholesale revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)14 barely a 
decade into that rule’s existence.15 Initial versions of the amendments 
 
 8. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation 
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 564 (2010) (noting that “99 percent of the world’s information is now 
generated electronically”). 
 9. For an empirical study of ESI-related disputes and sanctions motions, see generally 
Dan H. Willoughby, Rose Hunter Jones & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for E-Discovery 
Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790–91 (2010) (noting an empirical study found 
that there was a significant increase in sanctions motions and awards in cases involving e-
discovery between 2004 and 2010 and claiming that ESI-related sanctions “are at an all-time 
high”).  
 10. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.  
 11. See, e.g., William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint 
for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978) (“There is a very 
real concern in the legal community that the discovery process is now being overused. Wild 
fishing expeditions . . . seem to be the norm.”). 
 12. John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 537, 538 (2010). 
 13. Id. Rule 1 states that the purpose of the FRCP is “to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  
 14. Rule 37(e) was initially adopted as Rule 37(f) but redesignated as Rule 37(e) without 
change in 2007. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. 
 15. The amendments package was approved by the Supreme Court in April 2015 and is 
under congressional review. If approved by Congress, the amendments will go into effect on 
December 1, 2015. See Ross M. Gotler, Supreme Court Adopts Amendments to Federal Rules, 
Many Impacting E-Discovery Practice, to Become Law on December 1, 2015, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 
30, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5b631e63-87f2-4020-a4ba-8aec9ed89
e51 [http://perma.cc/X4V5-Y3FG] (“Unless Congress acts to the contrary, the amendments will 
become law on December 1, 2015.”). Up-to-date information as to the status of the amendments 
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were sweeping in scope and focus, but subsequent changes have 
unfortunately stripped some of the proposals’ most promising 
elements in the name of preserving trial courts’ discretion in the 
sanctions process. 
The current version of Rule 37(e), adopted in 2006, provides a 
safe harbor from sanctions for the innocent loss of ESI resulting from 
the standard operation of data-storage systems.16 The rule itself is 
deceptively concise: “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may 
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to 
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the 
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.”17 
The Advisory Committee hoped Rule 37(e) would protect parties 
from sanctions for “the routine alteration and deletion of information 
that attends ordinary use [of computer systems].”18 Instead, federal 
courts have developed a variety of standards for ESI-spoliation 
sanctions.19 As a result, many potential litigants feel pressure to 
engage in “massive and costly over-preservation” to mitigate the risk 
of judicial sanctions when litigation does arise.20 Overpreservation 
was one of several ESI-related problems that prompted the Duke 
Conference to conclude that the existing Rule 37(e) “has not proved 
to be much of a safe harbor.”21 
In the four years since the Duke Conference, the Advisory 
Committee has held numerous hearings and promulgated multiple 
amendment proposals for public comment. The current rules 
package, approved by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules (the Judicial Conference) and submitted to the 
Congress for review in April 2015, contains an amendment to Rule 
 
package can be found on the U.S. Courts’ website. See Pending Rules Amendments, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-amendments [http://perma.cc/
4HYD-MA2B] (listing rules currently pending review).  
 16. See 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, RICHARD 
L. MARCUS & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2284.1 (3d ed. 2014) 
(discussing courts’ limits on imposing sanctions under 37(e)).  
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 19. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 20. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – APRIL 2014, at 370 [hereinafter 2014 AGENDA BOOK], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15486/download [http://perma.cc/HB83-TFDC]. 
 21. Memorandum from Gregory P. Joseph to the Honorable John G. Koeltl 2 (May 11, 
2010) [hereinafter 2010 E-Discovery Panel Memorandum], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/
document/e-discovery-panel-executive-summary [http://perma.cc/PU5V-ZCQS]. 
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37(e) that would entirely replace the existing rule and, according to 
the Advisory Committee, provide more detailed guidance regarding 
permissible remedies for lost ESI.22 The proposed amendment 
requires courts to find “intent to deprive another party of the 
[electronically stored] information’s use”23 before imposing severe 
sanctions of dismissal or an adverse inference.24 Absent such a finding, 
courts “may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the 
prejudice” resulting from the lost ESI.25 
This Note analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed 
Rule 37(e) and argues that the amendment fails to address the 
perceived discovery issues because it focuses too heavily on 
preserving the trial court’s discretion in imposing sanctions and too 
little on incentivizing efficient and cooperative pretrial discovery. In 
its current state, the rules package is a missed opportunity that 
apparently results from a problematic misperception of what actually 
drives costly litigation. As this Note argues, the amendment package 
would benefit from greater attention to the role of interparty conduct 
and cooperation in preventing excessive cost and delay. The parties 
themselves have the best knowledge of both their claims and their 
internal electronic storage systems, meaning they are uniquely 
situated to develop workable and efficient ESI obligations early in the 
course of a case. Furthermore, a stringent judicial standard for 
imposing severe sanctions could create perverse incentives for parties 
in crafting internal preservation protocols. Thus, the Advisory 
Committee’s goals would be better served by revising the proposals to 
clearly explain the ESI preservation obligation and better incentivize 
cooperative resolution of e-discovery disputes during, and perhaps 
prior to, litigation.26 Even if the proposed amendments take effect as 
they currently stand, courts would benefit from limiting emphasis on 
bad-faith intent in ESI destruction and focusing instead on 
encouraging parties to cooperatively develop comprehensive case-
management plans with the help of data-system experts.27 
 
 22. Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, at Rules App. 
B-14 (June 14, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Rules Memorandum], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/
18218/download [http://perma.cc/54K4-6CUQ]. 
 23. Id. at Rules App. B-57. 
 24. An adverse inference either permits or requires the jury to assume the missing data was 
damaging to the party that lost it. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See infra Part III.B.1.  
 27. See infra Part III.B.2.  
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The Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of 
e-discovery procedure and spoliation law under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP), including the issues that led to the 
development of both Rule 37(e) and the current package of proposed 
amendments. Part II examines in detail the four proposals 
promulgated since the Duke Conference, including the amendments 
currently under congressional review. Finally, Part III analyzes the 
merits of the proposed amendment and argues for revisions, 
enforcement methods, and alternative approaches that will help give 
effect to the Advisory Committee’s stated goals. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE FRCP DISCOVERY RULES AND 
RULE 37(E) 
District Judge Lee Rosenthal, a former chair of the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Procedure, provides an apt 
characterization of the history of the FRCP discovery rules: “Since 
their inception in 1938, the rules of discovery have been revised with 
what some view as distressing frequency. And yet the rulemakers 
continue to hear that the rules are inadequate to control discovery 
costs and burdens.”28 Indeed, Rules 26 through 37 have experienced a 
number of revisions since 1938, often in response to the perception 
that discovery abuses were preventing the Rules from accomplishing 
their stated purpose of “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”29 
Like previous reform movements,30 the current amendments 
reflect the general feeling that “the system can be abused so that the 
goals of Rule 1 are not achieved.”31 Although the symptoms identified 
at the Duke Conference are relatively new, the diagnosis and 
treatment are not: the civil-litigation system is inefficient and flawed, 
and the rules of procedure must change accordingly.32 The discovery 
 
 28. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup 
and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 228 (2010).  
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 30. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 31. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 538 (“[D]iscovery can be used for impermissible purposes such 
as increasing the burdens of litigation to gain an unjustified advantage for the plaintiffs or 
defendants.”). 
 32. Id. at 544 (noting that Conference participants identified e-discovery as a particularly 
problematic source of litigation costs and “reached a consensus that a rule addressing 
preservation (spoliation) would be a valuable addition to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure”). 
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rules’ history shows that both the current and proposed versions of 
Rule 37(e) largely emphasize the role of the judiciary and the Rules 
themselves in addressing issues of cost, delay, and abuse. 
This Part provides the background necessary to understand the 
discovery rules’ structure and the role of Rule 37(e). Section A 
discusses the history of the rules governing discovery procedure and 
the development of the original version of Rule 37(e). Section B 
examines (1) Rule 37(e)’s application in the context of spoliation case 
law and (2) the issues identified at the Duke Conference that led to 
the current amendment process. 
A. History of the FRCP Discovery Rules 
1. 1938–2006.  Prior to the adoption of the FRCP in 1938, pretrial 
discovery at common law was “extremely limited.”33 Professor 
Stephen Subrin characterizes the early common-law litigation process 
“not as a rational quest for truth, but rather a method by which 
society could determine which side God took to be truthful or just.”34 
The discovery rules of the time support his interpretation. Litigants 
could not submit interrogatories or depose anyone besides the 
opposing party (even then only in the presence of the judge), and 
parties could not even reach discovery without “independently 
stat[ing] facts to substantiate the claims set forth in the complaint.”35 
Courts were vehemently opposed to the proverbial “fishing 
expedition[]” and, in general, “discovery opportunities were spotty 
and incomplete.”36 
In crafting a set of rules that commentators have come to view as 
a discovery revolution,37 the FRCP drafters intended to create a 
system through which parties could “obtain the fullest possible 
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.”38 Under the FRCP, 
parties enjoy “broader discovery rights than any state or federal 
 
 33. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 
1938 Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694 (1998). 
 34. Id. at 695. 
 35. Beisner, supra note 8, at 554–55. 
 36. Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: 
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 159 (1999).  
 37. Beisner, supra note 8, at 558 (“[T]he drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules radically 
expanded both the scope of permissible discovery and the tools parties could use to obtain it” 
thus going “‘further than any single jurisdiction’s discovery provisions.’”).  
 38. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).  
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jurisdiction” offered under the pre-1938 common law.39 This radical 
expansion of the discovery process reflected the drafters’ belief that 
liberal pretrial discovery would be more cost-effective and efficient 
because parties would focus discovery efforts on the issues and claims 
the opposition actually planned to litigate.40 
In the decades following 1938, the Advisory Committee 
broadened the discovery rules with a series of amendments until 
“[p]arty-controlled discovery reached its high-water mark in the 1970 
amendments.”41 Among other revisions, the 1970 amendments 
removed the judicial-permission requirement for most depositions 
and explicitly authorized the unlimited use of discovery methods.42 
Unsurprisingly, parties availed themselves of these broad rights to an 
extent that commentators came to view as abusive,43 and in 1983 the 
pendulum swung back toward active judicial case management with a 
series of reforms that the Advisory Committee chairman and drafter 
of the amendments called a “180-degree shift” in discovery 
procedure.44 The 1983 amendments, strengthened by further changes 
in 199345 and 2000,46 required judges to more actively control the 
process by holding discovery conferences47 and limiting burdensome 
production requests48 in proportion to the desired information’s 
importance.49 As the substance of these amendments suggests, the 
 
 39. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 232. 
 40. See Beisner, supra note 8, at 556–57 (“[T]he drafters concluded that . . . [m]utual self-
interest, coupled with a desire to avoid wasting clients’ time and money, would minimize 
discovery disputes and lead to the expeditious exchange of relevant information.”).  
 41. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 749 (1998).  
 42. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 233. 
 43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 44. ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUD. CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND 
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1984).  
 45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (adding, inter 
alia, paragraphs (1)–(4) of subdivision (a)). 
 46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (implementing, 
inter alia, national uniformity in disclosure practices).  
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983 
amendment. 
 49. See Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 235 (“The combination of discovery conferences and 
the direction to curtail disproportionate discovery required judges to undertake some 
managerial action in most cases and encouraged judicial involvement even when not 
required.”). 
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Advisory Committee felt that district judges were best positioned to 
rein in abusive discovery practices. 
Overall, the history of the FRCP discovery rules reveals the 
consistent theme that, from the drafters’ perspective, adjusting the 
degree of judicial oversight most effectively addresses inefficient and 
wasteful pretrial discovery conduct. As scholars have noted, however, 
the record of these amendments in practice shows that this approach 
is often largely ineffective.50 The 2006 amendment that produced the 
current Rule 37(e), which was never circulated for public comment,51 
reflects a continuation of this attitude toward procedural reform. 
2. The 2006 E-Discovery Amendments.  Before examining the 
history of Rule 37(e) in practice, it is helpful first to understand the 
factors that led to the creation of ESI-specific discovery rules in 2006. 
This Subsection lays out the issues identified by the Advisory 
Committee in dealing with ESI and the Committee's stated goals 
during the development of the Rule 37(e) safe harbor.  
a. The Unique Challenges of ESI.  Rule 37(e) became part of the 
FRCP in 2006 through a package of amendments intended to address 
the unique issues presented by ESI’s prevalence in modern civil 
litigation.52 As computer systems became central to business 
operations toward the end of the twentieth century, judges struggled 
to apply the discovery rules developed prior to the computer 
revolution.53 Some courts initially treated ESI exactly the same as 
paper documents—that is, by allowing liberal electronic discovery—
but critics of this approach observed that “a literal, unyielding 
approach to electronic data can be devastatingly expensive” in ways 
 
 50. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 8, at 563 (“These reforms, though well intentioned, failed 
to stem the delay and excessive costs that have become the hallmarks of pretrial discovery.”); 
Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 236 (“Although the debate over the change in the scope of 
discovery [in 2000] was passionate, it too was perceived as having little effect on practice.”). 
 51. Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic Discovery and Other Problems 4 (2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 52. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284.1 (“Rule 37(e) [was] adopted as Rule 37(f) in 
the 2006 package of amendments to deal with discovery of electronically stored information.”). 
 53. See Jonathan M. Redgrave & Ted S. Hiser, The Information Age, Part I: Fishing in the 
Ocean, A Critical Examination of Discovery in the Electronic Age, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 195, 203–
05 (2001) (“The trend in case law seems to indicate that as courts become more familiar with 
electronic data discovery, there is a corresponding increase in the propensity to grant liberal 
discovery into computer systems and files.”). 
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that the production of physical documents could never be.54 It became 
clear that the digital age had brought with it “a staggering volume of 
potentially discoverable information,” and existing discovery rules did 
not provide effective guidance for courts and parties.55 
The Duke Conference’s findings provide a comprehensive 
summary of the unique discovery issues implicated by ESI. Though 
the Duke Conference featured discussion of a wide variety of 
procedural topics, ESI preservation and production were primary 
emphases due to concerns that abusive e-discovery practice was the 
true culprit in creating excessive litigation costs and delays. Indeed, if 
Duke Conference participants agreed on one point, it was that the 
unprecedented volume of ESI has substantially changed the nature of 
discovery in civil litigation.56 
At the Duke Conference, contributors identified several 
attributes of ESI that tend to increase the cost of conducting 
discovery in the digital age. The advent of electronic data systems has 
generally made recordkeeping more efficient and cost-effective for 
businesses; for a variety of reasons, however, ESI can result in greater 
costs than physical documents in the litigation context. The most 
obvious reason is volume: when companies can store terabytes of data 
on hard drives, backup tapes, and cloud storage systems, the pool of 
potentially discoverable documents grows exponentially.57 Reviewing 
such voluminous records for responsiveness poses serious challenges. 
Litigants must first load the ESI onto special databases where 
attorneys can code and filter individual documents for relevance, a 
process that often entails costly restoration of older data from backup 
 
 54. Id. at 206; see also id. at 207 (“Litigation concerns should not dictate the purpose of 
business communication and data storage systems or else we will have truly allowed the tail to 
wag the dog.”). 
 55. Emily Burns, Michelle Greer Galloway & Jeffrey Gross, E-Discovery: One Year of the 
Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 202 (2008).  
 56. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 8, at 563 (“The advent of electronic discovery has 
significantly raised the stakes in discovery abuse.”); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, 
Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 785 (2010) (“[I]n 
cases in which the defendant was both a producing and requesting party with respect to ESI, 
costs were approximately 17 percent higher than in cases without electronic discovery.”).  
 57. For example, in 2005 ExxonMobil submitted a report to the Standing Committee 
claiming that its U.S.-based servers alone contained more than 500 terabytes of data. If 
preserved in physical copies, this figure would represent approximately 250 billion typewritten 
pages, or a single stack of pages nearly 16,000 miles high. Letter from Charles A. Beach, 
Coordinator, Corp. Litig., ExxonMobil Corp., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure (Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/e-discovery/04-CV-002.pdf [http://perma.cc/QT8K-VZDQ].  
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tapes and hard drives.58 Even with technologically advanced search 
functions that have made it easier to sift through electronic 
documents, the very nature of electronic communication can make 
such searches increasingly complex because “[t]he casual milieu of 
email and other electronic communications . . . gives rise to linguistic 
ambiguities that further complicate the reviewer’s task.”59 It should 
thus come as no surprise that Duke Conference contributors 
identified ESI as a primary cost driver in litigation, with one major 
company estimating that the cost of producing one gigabyte of data 
falls between $5,000 and $7,000.60 Given that a “midsize” case 
typically involves 500 gigabytes of data,61 commentators were 
justifiably concerned that “[t]he rising costs associated with electronic 
discovery threaten to drive all but the largest cases out of the 
system.”62 
b. The Development of Rule 37(e).  In the early 2000s both the 
American Bar Association and the Judicial Conference recognized 
the need to develop ESI-specific guidelines,63 and the 2006 
amendments implemented several important changes to e-discovery 
procedure. For example, the amendments created specific provisions 
governing the discovery of ESI identified as “not reasonably 
accessible”64 and directed parties to address ESI issues at the Rule 26 
discovery conference.65 Perhaps the most important change, however, 
was the addition of the Rule 37(e) safe harbor from sanctions for lost 
ESI.66 As the 2006 amendments’ Committee Note (2006 Committee 
Note) explains, Rule 37(e) provides a safe harbor against sanctions 
 
 58. See Beisner, supra note 8, at 565 (2010) (“The harsh reality is that the costs of 
producing electronic documents far exceed those of producing paper documents.”). 
 59. Id. at 566.  
 60. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5 (2008), (discussing the litigation 
costs of ESI), http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/EDiscovery_View_
Front_Lines2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/ABW9-JUJB]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Beisner, supra note 8, at 567; see also Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, 
Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 355 (2008) (identifying the four attributes of ESI 
cited by the Advisory Committee as its reasons for adopting an ESI-specific amendment). 
 63. See Burns et al., supra note 55, at 202–03 (describing the “[t]wo simultaneous 
developments [that] occurred in the early 2000s to address the discovery of ESI in litigation”). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).  
 66. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
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for a party that loses discoverable ESI “without culpable conduct on 
its part.”67 Prompted by the concern that courts too readily imposed 
sanctions for innocent failures to produce ESI,68 the provision 
addressed a preservation issue unique to electronic materials. Unlike 
physical documents—the spoliation of which would typically require a 
conscious decision to destroy evidence—ESI can be inadvertently 
overwritten or destroyed in the course of automatic processes 
“essential to . . . the ordinary operation of computer systems.”69 
Although subsection (e) is among the shortest provisions of Rule 
37, several of its phrases merit close examination. First, the Rule 
limits itself by providing a safe harbor only from sanctions imposed 
“under these rules,”70 preserving the trial court’s long-recognized 
ability to sanction parties under its own inherent powers.71 The 2006 
Committee Note makes this limitation explicit,72 creating a loophole 
through which courts have justified sanctions that might otherwise be 
inappropriate under the 37(e) safe harbor.73 As discussed below, this 
is one source of confusion the Advisory Committee hopes to resolve 
in the current amendments package.74 
Another key internal limitation in Rule 37(e) lies in the phrase 
“electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine . . . 
operation of an electronic information system.”75 According to the 
2006 Committee Note, “routine” refers to “the ways in which such 
systems are generally designed, programmed, and implemented to 
meet the party’s technical and business needs.”76 Thus, the provision 
 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 68. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2281. 
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 71. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (“It has long been understood 
that ‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of 
their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary 
to the exercise of all others.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 7 
Cranch 32, 34 (1812))).  
 72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. (“The 
protection provided by Rule 37([e]) applies only to sanctions ‘under these rules.’ It does not 
affect other sources of authority to impose sanctions or rules of professional responsibility.”).  
 73. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 196 n.3 (D.S.C. 2008) (“Rule 37(e)’s plain 
language states that it only applies to sanctions imposed under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (e.g., a sanction made under Rule 37(b) for failing to obey a court order), [sic] Thus, 
the rule is not applicable when the court sanctions a party pursuant to its inherent powers.”).  
 74. See infra notes 153–155. 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).  
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
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precludes spoliation sanctions for “the alteration and overwriting of 
information, often without the operator’s specific direction or 
awareness.”77 This language reflects the Committee’s understanding 
that ESI systems almost always incorporate automatic overwriting 
functions crucial to the efficient operation of the network, an 
attribute that distinguishes ESI from physical documents.78 
Accordingly, the reference to “routine operation” establishes a 
presumption that data-destruction protocols implemented to meet 
legitimate business needs fall within the Rule 37(e) safe harbor.79 
As the majority of sophisticated litigants employ “routine” ESI 
retention systems, most Rule 37(e) disputes tend to turn on whether 
the party’s use of its systems constitutes “good-faith operation.”80 
Whereas the “routine” nature of a document management system 
implicates the design and function of the system itself, the “good-
faith” element focuses on the party’s conduct in using (or suspending) 
the system in anticipation of litigation.81 On this point, the 2006 
Committee Note instructs that “[g]ood faith . . . may involve a party’s 
intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that routine 
operation to prevent the loss of information, if that information is 
subject to a preservation obligation.”82 Though no finding of intent is 
explicitly required to negate good faith, the purpose of this element is 
to prevent parties from “exploit[ing] the routine operation of an 
information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that 
operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information 
that it is required to preserve.”83 This has become the critical 
determination for courts applying Rule 37(e), and the ambiguity 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284.1 (“For reasons unrelated to the availability 
of information for use in litigation, such a system may often alter or destroy information. This 
characteristic of electronic information systems has no direct parallel in regard to hard-copy 
materials.”). 
 79. Cf. S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 82, 93 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(holding that defendant’s conscious decision to use the “wash with bleach” feature of its 
document retention system—as opposed to the “default mode”—did not constitute “routine, 
good-faith operation”).  
 80. See infra note 118. 
 81. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284.1 (“One feature of good faith design of a 
computer information system would be to comply with any pertinent obligations to preserve 
information within the control of the party.”). 
 82. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.  
 83. Id. 
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surrounding the implied-culpability requirement was one of the 
primary issues driving the current amendment process.84 
B. Rule 37(e) in Practice 
Though Rule 37(e) may have initially appeared to be a simple 
method of ensuring that parties would not be liable for the innocent 
loss of ESI, the safe harbor provision’s history since 2006 shows that 
the provision’s protections have proven largely ineffective. Post-2007 
spoliation case law suggests that Rule 37(e) suffers from two crucial 
points of ambiguity: the lack of a clear preservation obligation and 
the varying standards applied to the phrase “routine, good-faith 
operation.”85 When parties cannot be sure what preservation 
standards the court will employ, they will logically overpreserve at 
great cost to both physical resources and human capital. Furthermore, 
a problematic circuit split developed as to the culpability required for 
the most severe sanctions of adverse inferences and default 
judgments.86 After a thorough examination of these issues, the Duke 
Conference concluded that Rule 37(e) required substantial revision to 
provide parties with clear, workable guidelines for ESI preservation 
and production. 
1. Threshold Issues and the Problem of “Good Faith.”  Rule 37, 
the trial court’s proverbial “stick” for enforcing the FRCP discovery 
rules, offers district court judges a variety of curative measures. Its 
enumerated sanctions are not exclusive but rather “flexible, selective, 
and plural” and district courts may “use as many and as varied 
sanctions as are necessary to hold the scales of justice even.”87 This 
broad discretion has produced varying standards for the 
circumstances under which sanctions are appropriate and the type of 
sanctions that should apply, and a circuit split on the criteria for 
reviewing the imposition of sanctions.88 District judges have 
 
 84. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).  
 86. See infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 
 87. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284. 
 88. See, e.g., Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990) (implementing a five-
factor test for reviewing sanctions of dismissal or default); Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989) (articulating a four-factor test that 
includes “whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith” but no criteria regarding the 
public interest in resolving cases on the merits). For a comprehensive survey of Rule 37 
standards of review, see generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284 nn.36–38 and 
accompanying text.  
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traditionally refused to order sanctions until the offending party has a 
chance to cure the prejudice, but over the past thirty years courts 
have become increasingly willing to look to sanctions for their 
deterrent effects.89 
Before considering sanctions, the court must first determine that 
the lost information should have been preserved.90 Although the 
common-law duty to preserve evidence is fairly developed in 
spoliation case law,91 this threshold issue presents unique challenges in 
the context of ESI. Computer-system architects—especially those 
who develop large corporate networks—typically implement 
automatic-destruction software for outdated files, and thus the 
“should have been preserved” issue will often turn on when (or if) a 
party implemented a litigation hold on its ESI systems.92 As Judge 
Shira Scheindlin noted in her famously comprehensive set of opinions 
on electronic-discovery spoliation issued in Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC,93 the litigation hold is “only the beginning” of a party’s 
ESI-preservation obligations.94 Counsel must remain actively engaged 
in ESI preservation throughout discovery and take reasonable 
“affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of 
discoverable information are identified and searched.”95 This rigorous 
standard for ESI preservation makes sense given that electronic files, 
unlike physical evidence, can be permanently destroyed if the 
custodian simply neglects to halt the document-management system’s 
standard deletion processes. 
As discussed above,96 Rule 37(e) provides a safe harbor “to help 
companies escape sanction when their systems automatically caused 
 
 89. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284. 
 90. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that 
the party seeking sanctions for spoliation must establish, inter alia, “that the destroyed evidence 
was ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense”). 
 91. See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the duty to preserve is “an objective standard, asking not whether the party in fact 
reasonably foresaw litigation, but whether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances 
would have reasonably foreseen litigation”); E*Trade Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230 
F.R.D. 582, 588 (D. Minn. 2005) (“The obligation to preserve evidence begins when a party 
knows or should have known that the evidence is relevant to future or current litigation.”). 
 92. See Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 431 (“Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it 
must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation 
hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”). 
 93. Id. at 422.  
 94. Id. at 432.  
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra Part I.A.2.b.  
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the destruction of ESI even though they were under a duty to 
preserve.”97 Under the safe-harbor provision, a party should be safe 
from sanctions so long as it lost ESI through the “routine, good-faith 
operation” of its preservation systems.98 Unfortunately, the 2006 
Committee Note provides little guidance as to the meaning of “good 
faith” and courts have developed varying approaches that often 
conflate the “good faith” and “should have been preserved” 
determinations.99 
In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell,100 plaintiffs sought 
spoliation sanctions for defendants’ failure to produce their website’s 
server log data, which automatically stored a site visitor’s information 
for approximately six hours before deleting it permanently.101 The 
court found that defendants would have an obligation to preserve the 
server log data going forward but declined to impose sanctions under 
the Rule 37(e) “good faith” provision because defendants had neither 
refused a specific request for the data nor violated a preservation 
order.102 Though the court couched its decision in the Rule 37(e) safe 
harbor, the opinion suggests this decision turned not on “good faith” 
but rather on the lack of a preservation obligation.103 
Doe v. Norwalk Community College,104 decided shortly after the 
2006 amendments, illustrates an even narrower interpretation of the 
Rule 37(e) “good faith” provision. In Doe, the plaintiff sought 
sanctions for spoliation of emails and documents allegedly scrubbed 
from the defendant’s computer system after the plaintiff had filed her 
 
 97. Burns et al., supra note 55, at 217.  
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).  
 99. See, e.g., Trask-Morton v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 682 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(upholding denial of motions for sanctions due to defendant’s lack of bad faith in destroying 
backup tapes prior to receiving demand letter from plaintiffs); Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. 
Supp. 2d 1360, 1376–77 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (finding bad faith in defendant’s affirmative deletion of 
“undisputedly relevant” emails that “may have existed at the time the duty to preserve arose”); 
Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 541 F. Supp. 2d 274, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (refusing to 
impose sanctions due to lack of “clear and convincing evidence that [defendants] acted in bad 
faith, with an intent to mislead this Court”).  
 100. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093, 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. Cal. 
May 29, 2007). 
 101. Id. at *2–3, *13. 
 102. Id. at *14.  
 103. See id. (holding that defendants’ failure to retain the data was based in good faith due 
to the absence of “a specific request by defendants [sic] to preserve Server Log Data present 
solely in RAM and . . . a violation of a preservation order”).  
 104. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372 (D. Conn. 2007). 
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complaint but before her initial discovery request for the data.105 The 
district court imposed an adverse-inference sanction and refused to 
apply the Rule 37(e) safe harbor, holding that “in order to take 
advantage of the good faith exception, a party needs to act 
affirmatively to prevent the system from destroying or altering 
information, even if such destruction would occur in the regular 
course of business.”106 Critical to the court’s reasoning was its finding 
that the “defendants failed to suspend [their system] at any time” 
after litigation commenced, suggesting that a failure to implement a 
litigation hold after the filing of a complaint precludes a finding of 
good faith under Rule 37(e).107 
These rulings show how the Rule 37(e) safe-harbor provision has 
proven difficult to enforce in light of the confusion surrounding the 
duty to preserve ESI.108 Though the Advisory Committee may have 
hoped the rule would provide some protection for litigants who 
innocently lose ESI in the course of business, the ambiguity of 
“routine, good-faith operation” has led courts to interpret the safe 
harbor narrowly, relying primarily on the common-law duty to 
preserve.109 As a result, potential litigants face the difficult choice of 
either preserving all ESI at great cost or risking severe spoliation 
sanctions when litigation does indeed arise. 
2. The Duke Conference and the Road to Reform.  In May 2010, 
the Advisory Committee held the Duke Conference to address 
concerns that “the costs and delays in the federal civil-litigation 
system were impeding rather than promoting the goals of Rule 1.”110 
The Conference prompted “an extraordinary outpouring of empirical 
research, scholarly commentary, and thoughtful input” on the state of 
the civil-litigation system and directly led to the current amendment 
process.111 Discovery procedure was a central topic at the conference, 
 
 105. Id. at 375. 
 106. Id. at 378.  
 107. Id. 
 108. See Burns et al., supra note 55, at 217 (“[I]f the party cannot avail itself of the safe 
harbor because it had a duty to preserve data in the first instance, then Rule 37 does little to 
change the state of the pre-existing common law.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Edmonson v. Tyson Foods, No. 05-CV-329, 2007 WL 
1498973, at *6 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2007) (warning that parties “should be very cautious in 
relying upon any ‘safe harbor’ doctrine as described in new Rule 37([e])”). 
 110. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 538–39. 
 111. Id. 
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and contributors identified discovery as a primary source of excessive 
cost in modern litigation. 
Two specific issues from the Duke Conference provide 
important context for understanding the current FRCP amendments 
package. First, conference participants argued that the ubiquity of 
ESI in modern litigation exacerbates the discovery process’s 
inefficiencies and significantly contributes to rising costs.112 As 
discussed above, contributors unanimously agreed that ESI presents 
unique discovery challenges compared to physical evidence and thus 
merits distinct, careful treatment under the FRCP.113 Second, experts 
identified discovery sanctions’ uncertain criteria as a major source of 
confusion and cost before and during litigation.114 The Conference 
leaders recommended substantial revisions to the FRCP, starting the 
reform process that would lead to the current package of amendment 
proposals. 
Aside from the specific discovery problems created by the 
increasing prevalence of ESI, the primary discovery-related concern 
at the Duke Conference was the issue of spoliation sanctions. Given 
the increased costs associated with ESI production, some contributors 
felt that the threat of severe sanctions had become a “nuclear weapon 
that [could] be used to force large organizations to settle frivolous 
cases.”115 A comprehensive empirical study presented at the Duke 
Conference found that sanctions motions and awards in cases 
involving e-discovery had significantly increased between 2004 and 
2010; as a result, the authors claimed, ESI-related sanctions “[were] at 
an all-time high.”116 
Conference commentators criticized Rule 37(e)’s purported safe 
harbor, with one study finding that only two cases per year had met 
the safe harbor’s requirements since 2006 and that courts “ha[d] not 
shown a propensity to give the safe harbor broad and ready 
application.”117 Particularly problematic was the circuit split on the 
required culpability for the severe sanctions of adverse inferences and 
 
 112. See Beisner, supra note 8, at 564–70 (discussing numerous ways in which electronic 
discovery “significantly” increases the costs of discovery); Koeltl, supra note 12, at 540 (“It is 
plain that, although the cost of discovery in the median case may be reasonable . . . , the costs in 
high-stakes litigation can be enormous.”). 
 113. See supra Part I.A.2.a.  
 114. See supra Part I.B.  
 115. Beisner, supra note 8, at 571.  
 116. Willoughby et al., supra note 9, at 790–91.  
 117. Id. at 826–27.  
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dismissal. In the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
such sanctions required a finding of wrongful intent or “bad faith” in 
the destruction or overwriting of data.118 In contrast, the First, Second, 
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits held that bad faith may 
be relevant, but mere negligence in destroying ESI can merit severe 
sanctions when significant prejudice is shown.119 In the absence of a 
uniform culpability standard for discovery sanctions, parties feel 
pressure to overpreserve ESI at great cost to minimize the risk of 
facing sanctions for negligent data loss. Analysis of the Rule 37(e) 
amendments proposed since the Duke Conference shows that this 
confusion over sanctions standards was among the most pressing 
issues facing the Advisory Committee.120 
The findings and testimony presented at the Duke Conference 
led its participants to several important conclusions. First, there was 
 
 118. See, e.g., Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Simply establishing a 
duty to preserve evidence or even the negligent destruction of evidence does not automatically 
entitle a litigant to an adverse inference instruction in this circuit.”); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 
112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The adverse inference must be predicated on the bad 
faith of the party destroying the records.”); Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 
2d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“As a general rule, in this circuit, the severe sanctions of granting 
default judgment, striking pleadings, or giving adverse inference instructions may not be 
imposed unless there is evidence of ‘bad faith.’” (quoting Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 
F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005))). 
 119. See, e.g., Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A] 
finding of gross negligence merely permits, rather than requires, a district court to give an 
adverse inference instruction.”); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 
99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases 
involving the negligent destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of its 
own negligence.”); Zest IP Holdings v. Implant Direct Mfg., No. 10–0541, 2013 WL 6159177, at 
*9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (denying terminating sanctions but granting an adverse inference 
instruction when “[d]efendants were at least negligent in not implementing a litigation hold”); 
SJS Distrib. Sys. v. Sam’s East, No. 11–CV–1229, 2013 WL 5596010, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 
2013) (“In order to remedy the evidentiary imbalance created by the destruction of evidence, an 
adverse inference may be appropriate, even in the absence of a showing that the spoliator acted 
in bad faith.”); Food Serv. of Am. v. Carrington, No. CV–12–00175, 2013 WL 4507593, at *22 
(D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2013) (“‘[A] finding of bad faith is not a prerequisite’ to an imposition of an 
adverse inference.” (quoting Glover v. BIC, 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993))); Woodard v. 
Ford Motor Co., No. 1:11–cv–3092, 2013 WL 3024828, at *4 (D. Ore. June 13, 2013) (“A finding 
of prejudice need not be based on bad faith by the spoliating party: even if a plaintiff was 
minimally culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the prejudice to the defendant is 
extraordinary, denying it the ability to adequately defend its case.”); Gatto v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., No. 10–cv–1090, 2013 WL 1285285, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013) (granting an adverse 
inference and holding that “so long as the evidence is relevant, the offending party’s culpability 
is largely irrelevant”); Montoya v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 11–1922, 2013 WL 
6705992, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013) (granting an adverse inference instruction despite “no 
suggestion of bad faith or deliberate destruction of evidence”).  
 120. See infra Part II.A.3.  
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“substantial agreement” on “the need for [even more] active judicial 
management of litigation.”121 As several commentators observed, 
contention and distrust between parties tends to increase costs in 
pretrial disputes;122 thus, the Duke Conference called for a greater 
degree of court involvement in discovery procedure “as a way of 
assuring that proceedings are conducted in such a way that their costs 
are proportionate to the stakes of the litigation.”123 In a similar vein, 
Conference participants observed that rule changes “can only go so 
far to curb abuse” and stressed the importance of cooperation 
between parties in ensuring cost-effective and efficient litigation.124 
According to the Duke Conference, the solution to out-of-control 
cost and delay lies in a combination of active, thorough case 
management and a substantial change in the culture of civil litigation 
between opposing parties. 
But the Conference’s most important conclusion was perhaps the 
“consensus that a rule addressing preservation (spoliation) [of ESI] 
would be a valuable addition to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”125 Although there was some disagreement as to whether a 
rule change could effectively address discovery abuse,126 the Duke 
Conference’s E-Discovery Panel (the E-Discovery Panel or Panel) 
ultimately recommended that the Duke Conference’s Standing 
Committee (the Standing Committee) develop an ESI-specific 
preservation rule.127 The Panel suggested a set of important elements 
for such a rule, including a “trigger” point for the duty to preserve 
 
 121. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 542.  
 122. See, e.g., Lee & Willging, supra note 56, at 784 (“Contention among the parties also 
increases costs, at least for defendants.”); Craig B. Shaffer & Ryan T. Shaffer, Looking Past the 
Debate: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 178, 
178 (2013) (“The adversary character of civil discovery, with substantial reinforcement from the 
economic structure of our legal system, promotes practices that systematically impede the 
attainment of the principal purposes for which discovery was designed.”).  
 123. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 542. 
 124. Id. at 545; see also The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation 
Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331, 331 (2009) (“[A]ll stakeholders in the system . . . have 
an interest in establishing a culture of cooperation in the discovery process. Over-contentious 
discovery is a cost that has outstripped any advantage in the face of ESI and the data deluge.”).  
 125. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 544. 
 126. Compare Lee & Willging, supra note 56, at 768 (arguing that “there is scant evidence 
that alternative discovery rules would result in lower costs or shorter processing times in any 
predictable fashion”), with Joseph, supra note 51, at 7 (calling for rules “to define and 
circumscribe the pre-litigation duty to preserve [ESI]”).  
 127. 2010 E-Discovery Panel Memorandum, supra note 21, at 1. 
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ESI and a clear standard for discovery sanctions.128 These 
recommendations became the starting point for the amendment 
process that produced the package of proposals currently before 
Congress. 
II.  THE AMENDMENT PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CURRENT PROPOSALS 
Armed with an “unprecedented array”129 of empirical findings 
and scholarly commentary, the Advisory Committee left the Duke 
Conference with the impression that the federal civil-litigation system 
works fairly well but could be improved in several important respects. 
The Advisory Committee acknowledged the widespread concern that 
courts were not applying the FRCP discovery rules consistently and 
confusion over preservation obligations and sanctions—exacerbated 
by the ever-increasing prevalence of ESI—had made the discovery 
process inefficient and costly.130 Furthermore, the Committee felt that 
judges “must be considerably more involved in managing each case 
from the outset” in order to develop and enforce the appropriate 
scope of discovery on a case-by-case basis.131 Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the Committee noted that simply amending the 
FRCP is likely “not sufficient to make meaningful improvements” to 
the overall state of the civil-justice system.132 In its Report to the Chief 
Justice following the Duke Conference, the Advisory Committee 
neatly summarized its goals for the impending amendment process: 
“What is needed can be described in two words—cooperation and 
proportionality—and one phrase—sustained, active, hands-on judicial 
case management.”133 
This Part analyzes the amendment process thematically rather 
than chronologically. The context of the separate issues the Advisory 
Committee sought to address illuminates how the proposed 
amendments have developed throughout the notice-and-comment 
process. After laying out the specific questions facing the Advisory 
 
 128. Id. at 5–7. 
 129. JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1, http://
www.uscourts.gov/file/reporttothechiefjusticepdf [http://perma.cc/H7T9-C99C]. 
 130. Id. at 3–4. 
 131. Id. at 4.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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Committee in its attempt to fix Rule 37(e), Section A discusses the 
various ways in which the early rule proposals answered each 
question and tracks the development of the Committee’s approach. 
Section B examines the amendment in its current form as submitted 
to Congress in April 2015. 
A. Early Efforts 
Drawing on the recommendations of the Duke Conference, the 
Advisory Committee developed its Rule 37(e) amendment proposals 
with several important questions in mind: (1) whether the rule should 
apply to ESI or to all forms of evidence, (2) whether the rule should 
set out its own duty to preserve or continue to rely on the common-
law duty, (3) how best to resolve the circuit split regarding the 
required culpability for severe sanctions, and (4) whether to include a 
nonexclusive list of factors for judges to weigh when considering 
sanctions. Analysis of these four issues shows how the Committee, 
initially ambitious in its reform efforts, gradually pared down its 
proposals over time. 
Since the Duke Conference, the Advisory Committee has 
published four versions of the proposed Rule 37(e): two in January 
2013 (Primary 2013 Proposal134 and Alternative 2013 Proposal135), one 
in April 2014 (Penultimate Proposal136), and the version presently 
under congressional review (Current Proposal or Proposal137). This 
Section analyzes the first three proposals, which the Committee 
produced after extensive hearings and Committee meetings between 
2010 and 2013.138 Though the Committee’s early attempts were 
perhaps slightly overambitious, they contained several important 
elements that, unfortunately, did not survive in the current package of 
amendments. 
 
 134. For the full text of the Primary 2013 Proposal, see ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, 
U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – APRIL 2013, at 152–
53 [hereinafter 2013 AGENDA BOOK], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2013-04.pdf [http://perma.cc/679G-5KHP]. 
 135. For the full text of the Alternative 2013 Proposal, see id. at 160–61. 
 136. For the full text of the Penultimate Proposal, see 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, 
at 383–84. 
 137. For the full text of the Current Proposal, see infra Part II.B. 
 138. See 2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 143 (discussing the creation of the 
proposals after multiple Committee meetings). 
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1. Confining the Rule to ESI.  As a threshold matter, the 
Committee had to decide whether the new Rule 37(e) should be 
limited to ESI or whether it should apply to all types of discoverable 
evidence. The current version of Rule 37(e) applies only to ESI, yet 
the Primary 2013 Proposal contained no such restriction and would 
have applied whenever “a party failed to preserve discoverable 
information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or 
conduct of litigation.”139 In its explanatory materials the Committee 
provided little justification for the decision to apply the rule to all 
types of discoverable information, observing simply that “[t]he 
amended rule is designed to ensure that potential litigants who make 
reasonable efforts to satisfy their preservation responsibilities may do 
so with confidence that they will not be subjected to serious sanctions 
should information be lost despite those efforts.”140 Evidently this was 
a point of serious disagreement, and “[a]fter considerable discussion” 
the Committee decided to publish the Alternative 2013 Proposal, 
which was mostly identical to the Primary 2013 Proposal but would 
apply only when “a party failed to preserve discoverable 
electronically stored information that should have been preserved in 
the anticipation or conduct of litigation.”141 Proponents of the 
Alternative 2013 Proposal argued that ESI requires separate 
sanctions standards because, unlike physical evidence, “ESI tends to 
proliferate and usually can be found on many computers and servers, 
reducing the chance that its loss would have the same dire 
consequences as [would the] loss of the key piece of tangible evidence 
in a case.”142 These Committee members concluded that the 
traditional common-law standards for physical evidence do not make 
sense for ESI.143 
This viewpoint evidently won out, and the Committee became 
“firmly convinced that a rule addressing the loss of ESI in civil 
litigation is greatly needed.”144 Thus the Penultimate Proposal, like 
the Alternative 2013 Proposal, applied only when “a party failed to 
preserve electronically stored information that should have been 
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation.”145 As the 2006 
 
 139. Id. at 152. 
 140. Id. at 154. 
 141. Id. at 150, 160–61. 
 142. Id. at 150.  
 143. Id. at 150–51.  
 144. 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 370. 
 145. Id. at 383. 
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Committee Note explained, this decision followed extensive 
comments regarding the unique challenges of ESI preservation and 
testimony that “the explosion of ESI will continue and even 
accelerate.”146 Accordingly, the Committee concluded that “[t]he need 
for broad trial court discretion in dealing with these challenges will 
likewise increase.”147 As with the other key issues discussed below, the 
approach to this question shows the Advisory Committee’s tendency 
to start with sweeping reforms and gradually narrow its focus over 
subsequent proposals. 
2. The Duty to Preserve.  The other significant threshold issue 
was whether the new ESI rule should, as advocated by the chairman 
of the Duke Conference E-Discovery Panel, “specify the point in time 
when the obligation to preserve information” attaches.148 As discussed 
above, the current rule’s reliance on the common-law preservation 
duty has led to a variety of standards among the circuit courts and has 
sometimes swallowed the “routine, good-faith” element.149 Although 
the Duke Conference participants may have hoped that the 
Committee would take this reform process as an opportunity to 
clarify the duty to preserve ESI, the Committee members ultimately 
decided that such a task was simply too involved and case specific for 
the FRCP to resolve.150 
Despite the E-Discovery Panel’s calls for clarification on the 
duty to preserve, the Advisory Committee declined to address the 
issue in its 2013 proposals. It was not until the promulgation of the 
Penultimate Proposal in April 2014 that the Committee declared that 
the new Rule 37(e) would “not itself create a duty to preserve” but 
rather would “take[] the duty as it is established by case law.”151 
Claiming that “case law is well developed and fairly consistent in this 
area,” the Committee explained that there was no need for an ESI-
specific duty because “[t]he massive scope of electronic 
information . . . means that ample information for effective litigation 
often remains available even when it is not possible to know with 
certainty what information was contained in the lost source.”152 
 
 146. Id. at 371. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 2010 E-Discovery Panel Memorandum, supra note 21, at 5. 
 149. See supra Part I.B.1.  
 150. 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 372–73. 
 151. Id. at 370.  
 152. Id. at 372–73.  
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Implicit in this somewhat-tautological justification is the Advisory 
Committee’s view that the duty to preserve is not as important in 
ESI-spoliation cases because alternative sources are often available 
for the lost information. As a result, none of the proposals 
promulgated to date have attempted to define the duty to preserve 
ESI and have instead opted to continue relying on the non-uniform, 
common-law duty. 
3. Curative Measures and Severe Sanctions: Resolving the Circuit 
Split.  In each of the early rule proposals the Advisory Committee 
sought to bifurcate the sanctions determination into two 
circumstances: those that merit severe sanctions (adverse inferences 
and dismissal) and those that justify only “curative measures”153 (for 
example, ordering additional discovery or permitting the introduction 
at trial of evidence of the lost ESI). These changes represent the most 
significant aspect of the amendment process, as Duke Conference 
participants identified the circuit split on the required culpability for 
severe sanctions as the primary source of uncertainty surrounding 
ESI-preservation obligations.154 First, the Advisory Committee took 
definitive steps to “foreclose[] reliance on inherent authority or state 
law to impose litigation sanctions”155 by eliminating the “under these 
rules” loophole that currently allows courts to avoid the Rule 37(e) 
safe harbor.156 Having isolated the sanctions power to the FRCP, the 
Committee set out to provide definitive guidelines for severe 
sanctions and curative measures. 
On this issue, the 2013 proposals were again the most sweeping 
and, as the Advisory Committee discovered, problematically 
complicated. For example, under the Primary 2013 Proposal the 
court, after determining that the party failed to preserve discoverable 
information, would have the power to: 
(A) permit additional discovery, order curative measures, or order 
the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
caused by the failure; and 
 
 153. Id. at 373. 
 154. See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text. 
 155. 2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 155. 
 156. As discussed above, courts have used the phrase “under these rules” to justify imposing 
sanctions based on inherent power regardless of the applicability of Rule 37(e). See supra notes 
70–73 and accompanying text.  
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(B) impose any sanction listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A) or give an 
adverse-inference jury instruction, but only if the court finds that the 
failure: 
  (i) caused substantial prejudice in the litigation and was willful or  
  in bad faith; or 
  (ii) irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity to 
  present or defend against the claims in the action and was  
  negligent or grossly negligent.157 
The Committee Note accompanying this proposal clarifies the 
Advisory Committee’s approach. Absent a finding of bad faith or 
substantial prejudice, subdivision (A) authorizes only “measures that 
are not sanctions”—that is, curative orders that do not involve a 
default judgment or adverse inference instruction.158 These less severe 
options, such as ordering additional discovery or permitting the 
introduction of evidence of the lost information at trial, reflect the 
Committee’s view that courts “should employ the least severe 
sanction” necessary to mitigate the effects of the loss.159 
Subdivision (B) further partitions the court’s analysis based on 
the party’s degree of culpability, authorizing the most severe 
sanctions only upon one of two further findings. First, the court must 
determine that “the loss of information caused substantial prejudice 
in the litigation.”160 If, as is often the case with ESI, substitute 
evidence is available from other sources, the court would be limited 
to the curative measures available under subdivision (A). 
Alternatively, the court must conclude that “the party that failed to 
preserve did so willfully or in bad faith . . . with reference to the 
factors identified in Rule 37(e)(2).”161 A narrow exception to the “bad 
faith” requirement lies in subdivision (B)(ii), which permits severe 
sanctions for negligent loss of evidence only in those “extremely rare” 
cases “in which the only evidence of a critically important event has 
been lost.”162 
The Alternative 2013 Proposal modifies these standards slightly 
by eliminating the negligence exception so the rule would instead 
read as follows: 
 
 157. 2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 152. 
 158. Id. at 155. 
 159. Id. at 157.  
 160. Id. at 156.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 157.  
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(A) permit additional discovery, order curative measures, or order 
the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
caused by the failure; and 
(B) impose any sanction listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A) or give an 
adverse-inference jury instruction, but only if the court finds that the 
failure caused substantial prejudice in the litigation and was willful 
or in bad faith.163 
Aside from limiting the rule to ESI, this is the only significant 
difference between the two 2013 proposals. The change reflects some 
Advisory Committee members’ concerns that a negligence exception 
might allow severe sanctions for ESI “lost through an Act of God” 
and even “swallow the rule” by giving courts the ability to impose 
default judgments or adverse inferences for mere negligence.164 
Once again, proponents of the Alternative 2013 Proposal 
prevailed and the Penultimate Proposal omitted the negligence 
exception and allowed severe sanctions “only upon a finding that the 
party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the 
information’s use in the litigation.”165 As the Advisory Committee 
explained, this decision indicates its conclusion that “permitting an 
adverse inference for negligence creates powerful incentives to 
overpreserve, often at great cost.”166 Thus, the Committee evidently 
decided that the best course was to “preserve[] broad trial court 
discretion to cure prejudice caused by the loss of ESI,”167 limiting the 
court’s power only by bifurcating the determination into “curative 
measures” and “sanctions.”168 
4. The List of Factors.  Perhaps the best example of the Advisory 
Committee gradually eliminating a major element of the proposed 
amendments is its treatment of the nonexclusive list of factors for the 
court to weigh when considering sanctions. The list first appeared in 
the Primary 2013 Proposal: 
(2) Factors to be considered. In determining whether a party failed to 
preserve discoverable information that should have been preserved 
in the anticipation or conduct of litigation, whether the failure was 
 
 163. Id. at 161. 
 164. Id. at 150.  
 165. 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 383. 
 166. Id. at 379. 
 167. Id. at 376.  
 168. Id. at 373.  
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willful or in bad faith, and whether the failure was negligent or 
grossly negligent, the court should consider all relevant factors, 
including: 
  (A) the extent to which the party was on notice that litigation was  
  likely and that the information would be discoverable; 
  (B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to preserve the  
  information; 
  (C) whether the party received a request to preserve information,  
  whether the request was clear and reasonable, and whether the  
  person who made it and the party engaged in good-faith  
  consultation about the scope of preservation; 
  (D) the proportionality of the preservation efforts to any  
  anticipated or ongoing litigation; and 
  (E) whether the party timely sought the court’s guidance on any  
  unresolved disputes about preserving discoverable information.169 
As the Committee Note to this subdivision makes clear, the 
enumerated factors are “not exclusive; other considerations may bear 
on these decisions . . . [and] the court’s focus should be on the 
reasonableness of the party’s conduct.”170 The Committee Note also 
provides a detailed explanation of each factor, at several points 
instructing courts to be “sensitive to the party’s sophistication” when 
evaluating discovery conduct.171 Particularly notable in these factors is 
the theme of encouraging parties to engage in “meaningful discussion 
of the appropriate preservation regime” so as to “resolve issues 
concerning preservation before presenting them to the court.”172 
Following the comment period for the 2013 proposals, the 
Committee acknowledged that “[t]he value of any list of factors has 
been vigorously debated, and the wisdom of several of the factors also 
has been questioned.”173 This was, it seems, the beginning of the end 
for the list of relevant factors. The Penultimate Proposal was the last 
to contain the list, and even then in shortened form and in brackets so 
as to denote the disagreement within the Advisory Committee:174 
(4) In applying Rule 37(e), the court should consider all relevant 
factors, including: 
  (A) the extent to which the party was on notice that litigation was  
 
 169. 2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 152–53.  
 170. Id. at 158. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 159.  
 173. 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 373. 
 174. Id. 
O’BRIEN IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2015  11:14 AM 
2015] ANALOG SOLUTIONS 179 
  likely and that the information would be relevant; 
  (B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to preserve the  
  information; 
  (C) the proportionality of the preservation efforts to any  
  anticipated or ongoing litigation; and 
  (D) whether, after commencement of the action, the party timely  
  sought the court’s guidance on any unresolved disputes about  
  preserving discoverable information.175 
In the accompanying materials, the Committee explained the 
arguments for and against the inclusion of the factors. Opponents 
expressed concerns that the list might be mistaken as exclusive, “may 
become a routine set of items to be checked off . . . without sufficient 
care,” or may have been expressed poorly.176 Those in favor of the 
factors stressed that they could provide valuable guidance to courts 
making this complex determination, “particularly when acting in an 
environment that changes as rapidly as practices change in the 
electronic storage of information.”177 Ultimately, the Advisory 
Committee decided to publish the list in brackets so as to invite 
comment on whether “it may be better to address the factors only in 
the Committee Note” as opposed to the text of the rule.178 
Though the details of these individual proposals are primarily 
useful as context for the development of the language in the current 
rules package, the amendment process’s general theme is important. 
The Committee started with a comprehensive, highly detailed rule 
that would provide the clearest possible guidance for courts and 
slowly pared down its language in the name of preserving trial court 
discretion. As discussed below, this increasingly conservative 
approach produced a rule proposal that will likely struggle to address 
the serious issues raised by Duke Conference participants. 
B. The Current Proposal 
Four years of hearings, conferences, proposals, and commentary 
came to a head in June 2014 when the Advisory Committee 
submitted its latest package of FRCP amendments to the Standing 
Committee, which adopted the amendments and passed them on for 
 
 175. Id. at 383–84. 
 176. Id. at 380.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 373.  
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review by the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court.179 
Compared to the early attempts, the Current Proposal is remarkably 
concise: 
(e) FAILURE TO PRESERVE ELECTRONICALLY STORED 
INFORMATION. If electronically stored information that should have 
been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost 
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it 
cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the 
court: 
  (1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the  
  information, may order measures no greater than necessary to  
  cure the prejudice; or 
  (2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to  
  deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation  
  may: 
      (A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the 
      party; 
      (B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the  
      information was unfavorable to the party; or 
      (C) dismiss the action and enter a default judgment.180 
Like the previous two attempts, the Current Proposal is explicitly 
limited to ESI. Similarly, in the Current Proposal the Committee 
reaffirmed its commitment to relying on the common-law duty to 
preserve. Having concluded that “a detailed rule specifying the 
trigger, scope, and duration of a preservation obligation is not 
feasible,” the Committee instead opted simply to “craft a rule that 
addresses actions courts may take when ESI that should have been 
preserved is lost.”181 The accompanying Committee Note provides 
scarce guidance regarding the common-law duty, observing simply 
that courts “should consider the extent to which a party was on notice 
that litigation was likely and that the information would be relevant” 
and that a duty to preserve “may in some instances be triggered or 
clarified by a court order.”182 
As with the early proposals, the Advisory Committee’s primary 
goal appears to be eliminating the circuit split on culpability 
 
 179. The Supreme Court approved the amendments, which will take effect December 1, 
2015 unless Congress rejects them. See supra note 15. 
 180. 2014 Rules Memorandum, supra note 22, at Rules App. B-56 to -57.  
 181. Id. at Rules App. B-15; see also id. at Rules App. B-59 (“Rule 37(e) is based on this 
common-law duty [to preserve]; it does not attempt to create a new duty.”). 
 182. Id. at Rules App. B-59 to -60. 
O’BRIEN IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2015  11:14 AM 
2015] ANALOG SOLUTIONS 181 
standards. Though the Current Proposal tightens the Rule’s language, 
the overall effect is largely identical to that of the earlier efforts. 
Subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) create separate standards for curative 
measures and severe sanctions, with the latter limited to cases in 
which a party destroys ESI with the intent to withhold it from the 
opposition. This approach, which explicitly “rejects cases . . . that 
authorize the giving of adverse-inference instructions on a finding of 
negligence or gross negligence,” reflects the Committee’s view that 
“[t]he better rule for the negligent or grossly negligent loss of 
electronically stored information is to preserve a broad range of 
measures to cure prejudice caused by its loss, but to limit the most 
severe measures to instances of intentional loss or destruction.”183 
Thus, the primary objective of subdivision (e)(2) is to resolve the 
circuit split regarding the degree of culpability required for the most 
serious sanctions.184 
Conspicuously absent from the Current Proposal, however, is the 
three initial proposals’ list of factors. Not only were the factors struck 
from the Current Proposal itself, but the Committee Note also no 
longer contains the extensive guidelines that had appeared in the 
Committee Notes to the earlier proposals. The Current Proposal’s 
accompanying memorandum does not explain this decision, which is 
surprising considering that the earlier Committee materials merely 
suggested moving the factors to the Committee Note and not 
eliminating them entirely.185 
Some of the new language could be read as a reincorporation of 
the factors. For example, one notable addition to the Current 
Proposal is the limiting phrase “[i]f [ESI] . . . is lost . . . because a 
party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it.”186 This language 
addresses the concern that, given ESI’s ever-increasing volume and 
complexity, “perfection in preserving all relevant electronically stored 
information is often impossible.”187 The Committee Note provides 
that courts must “be sensitive to the party’s sophistication with regard 
to litigation in evaluating preservation efforts” and recognizes that in 
 
 183. Id. at Rules App. B-65.  
 184. Id. at Rules App. B-17.  
 185. See, e.g., 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 373 (“The list may help potential 
litigants make reasonable preservation decisions, may help counsel frame effective arguments, 
and may help courts to understand and respond to the arguments. On the other hand, it may be 
better to address the factors only in the Committee Note.”). 
 186. 2014 Rules Memorandum, supra note 22, at Rules App. B-56.  
 187. Id. at Rules App. B-61. 
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some cases information “may be destroyed by events outside the 
party’s control.”188 Accordingly, this phrase explicitly precludes 
sanctions “when the loss of information occurs despite the party’s 
reasonable steps to preserve [it].”189 Thus, one could read this new 
phrase as a more succinct version of the factor that instructed the 
court to be cognizant of parties’ resources and sophistication when 
considering sanctions, but in any event the Current Proposal contains 
no actual “list of relevant factors” in any recognizable form. 
Reading this amendment in conjunction with the initial proposals 
shows how the Advisory Committee gradually narrowed its focus to a 
few specific, attainable goals. First, the Current Proposal and 
accompanying Committee Note go to considerable lengths to resolve 
the circuit split on adverse-inference and default-judgment culpability 
requirements. Second, the Committee repeatedly stresses the 
importance of preserving the trial court’s broad discretion, scaling 
back any attempts at providing explicit guidelines and limiting district 
judges only by instructing them to “employ measures ‘no greater than 
necessary to cure the prejudice’” caused by the loss of ESI.190 This 
approach leaves too much in the hands of the trial court, however, 
and will likely do little to prevent costly and inefficient 
overpreservation. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED RULE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR REVISION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Although this package of amendments represents, on the whole, 
a significant improvement over the current e-discovery regime, the 
proposed Rule 37(e) will likely prove ineffective in accomplishing the 
Duke Conference’s goals due to the Advisory Committee’s 
unwillingness to provide more explicit guidelines for the district 
court’s determination of sanctions. This Part first discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Current Proposal as it stands and 
then argues for specific revisions and enforcement approaches that 
would help effectuate the Advisory Committee’s stated objectives. 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at Rules App. B-63. 
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A. The Merits of Proposed Rule 37(e) in the Context of the 2014 
Rules Package 
1. Strengths.  Compared to the current version of Rule 37(e), the 
Current Proposal contains several major revisions that should 
substantially benefit both litigants and district courts. At the most 
basic level, eliminating the phrase “under these rules” should have a 
much-needed limiting effect on ESI-spoliation sanctions by 
precluding resort to the court’s inherent power. This is a small 
change, but a critical one—by cabining the court’s sanctioning powers 
to the provisions of Rule 37(e), the amendment confines the court’s 
discretion to the FRCP standards and assures litigants that judges will 
not resort to jurisdiction-specific common-law criteria when 
considering a motion for sanctions. 
Similarly, the “reasonable steps” provision of the Current 
Proposal should, over time, give parties confidence that their 
internally developed preservation protocols will insulate them from 
some discovery sanctions. The Committee Note provides that 
“‘reasonable steps’ . . . does not call for perfection.”191 Although the 
“reasonableness” of a party’s efforts is ultimately up to the discretion 
of the district court, the language in the Committee Note suggests 
that the Committee has rejected a line of cases that approaches strict 
liability on the theory that once the duty to preserve attaches, “failure 
to preserve evidence resulting in the loss or destruction of relevant 
information is surely negligent” and thus sanctionable.192 The Current 
Proposal instead creates a “proportionality” approach that is 
“sensitive to party resources.”193 Although the Proposal would benefit 
from more specific guidance on the duty to preserve, this aspect of 
the Proposal is an important step toward clarifying preservation 
obligations and “discourag[ing] unfair allegations of preservation 
misconduct while simultaneously promoting compliance and reducing 
unnecessary overpreservation.”194 
Finally, the Current Proposal should effectively resolve the 
circuit split regarding culpability for severe sanctions. The Committee 
 
 191. Id. at Rules App. B-61. 
 192. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 
F. Supp. 2d 456, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 193. 2014 Rules Memorandum, supra note 22, at Rules App. B-61. 
 194. THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RULES PACKAGE AS 
PRESENTED TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (SEPT. 2014), at 17, http://www.lfcj.com/
uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/2014commentsonrulepackageoct11.pdf [http://perma.cc/3FP9-DY7H]. 
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Note explicitly rejects Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge 
Financial Corp.,195 the leading case for the proposition that negligent 
loss of discoverable information is sufficient for the most serious of 
the discovery sanctions.196 To the extent that it precludes reliance on 
this line of cases, the proposed Rule 37(e) will likely accomplish its 
goal of settling this dispute between the circuits. 
2. Weaknesses.  Despite the aforementioned improvements, the 
Current Proposal is lacking in several important respects that will 
prevent it from resolving the issues plaguing the civil-litigation 
system. The most significant weakness is the Proposal’s continued 
reliance on the common-law duty to preserve information in 
anticipation or conduct of litigation.197 This decision could severely 
undercut the Advisory Committee’s hopes of creating uniform 
standards for Rule 37(e) sanctions, as it may perpetuate ambiguity 
with respect to this critical threshold issue by allowing individual 
courts to develop conflicting approaches to the duty to preserve ESI. 
By failing to establish uniform preservation standards, the Advisory 
Committee has missed an opportunity to address the problematic 
uncertainty afflicting the early stages of the sanctions process. 
As noted above, Duke Conference participants stressed the 
importance of incentivizing cooperation between the parties as a 
means of reducing costly and inefficient discovery disputes.198 Though 
initial proposals contained provisions directing courts to consider 
such cooperative efforts when ruling on a sanctions motion,199 the 
Current Proposal seems to have scaled back its emphasis on 
cooperation almost completely. For example, the Proposal includes a 
provision that will amend Rule 1 to read “These rules should be 
construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
 
 195. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 196. See 2014 Rules Memorandum, supra note 22, at Rules App. B-65 (“[Subdivision (e)(2)] 
rejects cases such as Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d 
Cir. 2002), that authorize the giving of adverse-inference instructions on a finding of negligence 
or gross negligence.”).  
 197. See id. at Rules App. B-59 (“The new rule applies only if the lost information should 
have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation . . . .”). 
 198. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.  
 199. See, e.g., 2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 153 (including as one of the Rule 
37(e)(2) factors “whether the person who made [the discovery request] and the party engaged in 
good-faith consultation about the scope of preservation”). 
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and proceeding.”200 In its Committee Note, however, the Committee 
explicitly provides that the Rule 1 amendment does not create a new 
basis for sanctions and admits that “a rule amendment alone will not 
produce reasonable and cooperative behavior among litigants.”201 
This language, coupled with the gradual elimination of provisions 
encouraging cooperation from the Rule 37(e) proposal, suggests that 
the Rule 1 amendment is largely aspirational. If interparty conduct 
has no explicit bearing on the court’s ability to impose sanctions, it is 
difficult to see how courts can effectively incentivize the degree of 
cooperation envisioned by the Duke Conference contributors. 
B. Recommendations for Revision and Effective Enforcement 
1. Revision.  The Current Proposal was approved by the Supreme 
Court in April 2015 and is presently before Congress, which will 
either reject the Proposal or allow it to take effect on December 1, 
2015. If the Advisory Committee has the opportunity to revisit the 
Current Proposal in the coming months, it would benefit from two 
primary revisions to the existing text. First, the Committee should 
scale back its explicit reliance on the common-law duty to preserve 
and provide at least some specific guidelines for the courts on this 
threshold issue. Second, it should reinstate the list of factors 
promulgated in the initial proposals with some additional clarifying 
language. 
Although it may indeed be impractical to craft a comprehensive, 
uniform duty to preserve ESI in the FRCP, the new Rule 37(e) would 
benefit from some degree of guidance regarding the trigger and scope 
of the threshold duty. As attorney Gregory P. Joseph—chair of the E-
Discovery Panel at the Duke Conference—observes, “the nebulous 
standard of common law . . . does not meaningfully inform the 
prospective litigant whether or when the duty has been triggered.”202 
Though the filing of a complaint or a written production request 
generally suffices as a trigger, the Current Proposal or its Committee 
Note should include nonexclusive examples of events that do or, 
perhaps more importantly, do not create a preservation obligation. 
For example, as Joseph suggests, the Committee Note could provide 
that actions such as “notifying an insurance company or indemnitor of 
 
 200. Id. at Rules App. B-13. The new text is in italics. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Joseph, supra note 51, at 8.  
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potential liability” or “preparing an incident report or other steps 
taken in the ordinary course of business in anticipation of litigation” 
are sufficient to activate the preservation obligation.203 Furthermore, 
the Advisory Committee should follow the advice of the E-Discovery 
Panel and emphasize the importance of contractual duties in 
triggering the preservation obligation.204 It may seem obvious that 
contract provisions can create the duty, but the Advisory Committee 
could encourage parties to contract more carefully for their 
preservation obligations by highlighting the role of such provisions in 
the Rule or the Committee Note. 
Furthermore, the common-law duty is problematic because it 
does not provide a clear scope of the preservation duty once it has 
attached. The Advisory Committee should revise its proposal to 
establish a baseline for the scope of the duty by specifying particular 
types of data that must be preserved (for example, the email records 
of named parties or top executives), leaving further requirements to 
the court’s discretion or party agreement on a case-by-case basis. 
District courts have previously held that, once triggered, the duty to 
preserve automatically applies to the ESI belonging to key 
employees.205 For example, in Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land 
O’Lakes, Inc.206 the court found that the defendant had violated its 
duty to preserve ESI by failing to place a litigation hold on the hard 
drives of “employees who played a significant or decision-making 
role.”207 Courts may apply basic standards such as a “key employees” 
provision through reliance on the common-law duty, but Rule 37(e) 
would benefit from the addition of such examples on a nonexclusive 
basis. Though this measure would not prevent all spoliation disputes, 
it would at least provide a basic framework from which courts could 
develop a more predictable common-law duty. 
Next, the Advisory Committee should reincorporate the list of 
relevant factors included in its initial proposals.208 Given the rapidly 
 
 203. Id. at 9.  
 204. See 2010 E-Discovery Panel Memorandum, supra note 21, at 5 (suggesting various 
triggers including a “contractual duty to preserve”).  
 205. See, e.g., In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting an 
adverse inference instruction and holding that “[r]elevant documents would include any e-mails 
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condition”).  
 206. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614 (D. Colo. 2007). 
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changing nature of electronic-storage technology, it seems unwise to 
discard this provision due to fears that litigants would mistakenly 
believe it to be a comprehensive list of important factors. The 
Advisory Committee could easily assuage these fears by simply 
stating that this list is nonexclusive and intended to provide both 
litigants and courts a helpful starting point in assessing preservation 
conduct. The Advisory Committee would be especially well advised 
to include a factor directing the court to consider the extent to which 
the offending party has complied with district-specific e-discovery 
guidelines and, more importantly, with any preservation standards 
developed in cooperation with the opposing party. This factor could 
incentivize proactive resolution of discovery disputes in two ways. 
First, it would encourage district courts to develop comprehensive 
case-management standards like those already in use in many districts 
nationwide.209 Second, incorporating the theme of party cooperation 
into discovery-sanctions criteria will remind parties that cooperating 
early to establish discovery protocols can help insulate both sides 
from sanctions if disputes do arise.210 
2. Enforcement.  Should the proposed amendments package 
come into effect as it stands, however, certain enforcement standards 
would help courts achieve uniformity and encourage cost-effective, 
efficient litigation. In the context of proposed Rule 37(e)(2), courts 
should minimize their reliance on findings of bad faith or willfulness 
in determining whether severe sanctions are appropriate. Spoliation 
case law has shown that courts struggle to articulate clear criteria for 
intent to withhold discoverable material (especially ESI), and as a 
result they often conflate “good faith” analysis with the threshold 
duty-to-preserve issue.211 As the Current Proposal already leaves the 
duty-to-preserve question entirely in the hands of the trial court, 
attempts to discern “bad faith” will risk a continuation of the 
problems inherent in the current version of the Rule. 
Instead of searching for evidence of bad-faith intent, courts 
should take a proactive approach to Rule 37(e) and work with 
 
 209. See infra notes 216–219 and accompanying text.  
 210. See Joy Flowers Conti & Richard N. Lettieri, In re ESI Local Rules Enhance the Value 
of Rule 26(f) “Meet and Confer,” 49 JUDGES’ J., no. 2, Spring 2010, at 29, 34 (“[W]hen a dispute 
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litigants to create case-specific ESI-preservation guidelines, treating 
violations of these agreements as prima facie sanctionable conduct 
and tailoring the sanctions to the degree of prejudice shown. Under 
Rule 83, district courts may adopt local rules of practice that are not 
duplicative or contrary to provisions of the FRCP or other federal 
statutes.212 Since the 2006 e-discovery amendments, many districts 
have developed ESI-specific guidelines with varying degrees of 
detail.213 For example, the Delaware Default Standard, adopted in at 
least three other districts,214 limits requesting parties to ten “focused” 
electronic search terms, invokes cooperation as its guiding principle, 
and states that the Default Standard shall apply only if “the parties 
are unable to agree on the parameters and/or timing of discovery.”215 
In the absence of specific guidance from the FRCP, the district 
courts should require parties to implement comprehensive case-
management plans like those already in use in several districts.216 For 
example, the Northern District of California’s “Guidelines for the 
Discovery of Electronically Stored Information” contains a thirty-
five-point ESI discovery checklist that instructs the parties to meet 
and discuss topics such as “[t]he ranges of creation or receipt dates for 
any ESI to be preserved” and “search method(s),” including specific 
words or phrases . . . that will be used to identify discoverable ESI.”217 
Plans like these serve the dual purposes of resolving discovery 
disputes as early as possible and encouraging party communication 
and cooperation throughout the case. Similarly, district courts should 
enlist the help of special masters with data-system expertise in the 
construction of these plans, particularly in the more complex (and 
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correspondingly more expensive) cases.218 This approach should help 
to control ESI-related costs throughout litigation. As Judge 
Scheindlin notes, “[o]ne obvious advantage [to the use of special 
masters] is that all parties share the cost of one expert, rather than the 
duplicative costs associated with competing experts.”219 Some districts 
already require or encourage parties to supply such experts. The 
District of Kansas, for example, suggests that parties designate an e-
discovery liaison who is “knowledgeable about the technical aspects 
of e-discovery” and who “should be responsible for organizing each 
party’s e-discovery efforts to insure consistency and thoroughness.”220 
Similarly, the Northern District of California’s e-discovery guidelines 
provide that parties “shall designate an e-discovery liaison who 
will . . . [b]e prepared to participate in e-discovery dispute resolution 
to limit the need for Court intervention.”221 The regular use of e-
discovery experts should, over time, result in more efficient ESI 
dispute resolution and also relieve some pressure on judges, who 
often have little familiarity with technologically advanced data-
storage systems.222 
When experienced litigants are involved, courts could also give 
weight to prior preservation agreements between the parties and 
allow previously negotiated preservation schemes to inform the scope 
of the duty. For example, sophisticated parties might agree at the 
outset of a business transaction that correspondence between certain 
employees will be preserved even in the absence of foreseeable 
litigation. For all such agreements and standing orders, the district 
court should treat violations as prima facie sanctionable conduct so 
that parties can confidently develop internal preservation protocols 
that will minimize the risk of discovery sanctions. Although these 
measures would not be sufficient to eliminate spoliation issues 
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entirely, they would encourage cooperative resolution of discovery 
disputes and, over time, reduce the need to engage in costly 
overpreservation. 
CONCLUSION 
If the history of the FRCP discovery rules tells us anything, it is 
that the process of amending the rules is a tricky one. It often takes 
years to appreciate the true effects of any one amendment, and the 
astonishingly rapid rate of technological development in the last 
quarter century has only made it more difficult for the Advisory 
Committee to develop clear, effective guidelines. The Proposal 
currently before Congress is, in several respects, a very strong effort; 
it resolves several key sources of ambiguity while preserving the trial 
court’s ability to adjust its sanctions doctrine as the discovery 
landscape continues to change. Unfortunately, however, the Current 
Proposal reflects a problematic focus on the court’s role in fixing the 
issues facing the civil-litigation system, and it is difficult to see the 
Proposal as a significant improvement on the existing Rule. Until the 
Advisory Committee proposes amendments that more effectively 
incentivize party cooperation throughout the pretrial process, litigants 
will continue to experience the costs, delays, and abusive discovery 
practices that have persisted since the advent of the FRCP. 
 
